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1.Introduction
Samuelson〔5〕〔7〕and Diamond〔2〕clarify that thelaissez faire
1ong-run equilibriumdoesnotachieve th  golden-rule except a
mere accident.That is,they show there is no“Invisible Hand”
or theperfectcompetition is notl kely tolead to an eficient
situation.Su table gov rnment intervention may attain thegolden-
rule.In fact Samuelson〔7〕,Stein〔8〕〔9〕and Takahashi〔10〕show
respective instruments for government to attain thegoIden-rule
as thelong-run equilibrium.
The first purpose f this paper is to show that thelong-run
equilibrium n the normalcase achievesthe golden-rule and that
the1ong-runequilibrium in the abnormalcaseattains th wealth-
* The earlier version of this paper was presented at he Annualmeet-
ing of the Japan Association of Economics and Econometrics held at
Tokyo Metropolitan Un versity in September1979.I wouldliketothank
ProfessorsO amu Nishimura(Doshisha University)as discussant and
Hiroaki 〇sana(Keio Un versity)as a chairman of the fourth sectionof
the AnnualMeeting.Especia11y I am  b nefited by valuable nd critica1
comments of Professor Nishimura. I am also grateful to Professors
Shozaburo Fujino (Hitotsubashi University) and Masayuki Sekine
(Tohoku Gakuin U iversity) for their helpfu1 comments on origina1
Japanease draft.〇f course I am responsible for any remaining errors.
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capita1 equilibrium, wh ch means that the amount in private
wealth is exactlyequalto the stock ef capital. We, as we1l as
(1)Gale〔3〕,define the normalcaseasa case that the golden-rule
stock of capitalislarger than the amount of wealth people wish
to hold in thelaissez faire andthe abnormalcase otherwise.
Thesecond purpose ofthis paper is to consider theconomic
meanings of both casesof normaland ab ormalmoredeeplyand
to clarify the causes of occurrence of the abnormalcace.
Eliminatingthe sources of occurrence of thabnormal case,
we can expect thegolden-ruleasthelong-run equilibrium. The
third purpose i  to show the instruments for governmenttoexpel
to them and to show that the conomy carrying out he instru-
ments a ymptotically converges to thegolden-rule.This givesa
solution for the stability anal sis inthe economy carr ing out a
security program,which has been reserved by Samuelson〔7〕.And
finally the fourth purpose is to show introducing a socialsecurity
program to the conomy never abate the utilityleve1of repr sent-
ative person in steady-state.
We construct the framework of our model in section 2a d
envolve arguments to a tain thesecond purpose insection3.Main
subject in section4is the stability anal sis of our modeI.The
analysis is intensively related to he first purpose.Finally section5
examinesthe stabilityin the co omy introducing the security
program in order to achieve optimalgrowth.
(l) Gale shows the1ong-run equ出brium in thelaissez faire caninevita-
bly achieve the golden-rule in the normalcase,but his modelisnota
neoclassicalgrowth model.
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2.The model
We state behaviors of consumers and producers in this section.
There aretwo generations  any time: a youngergeneration
which worl【s and an older generation which retires.Thelife-cycle
of each individualconsistsof a w rk ng periodand a retiring
period.The periods are ofequallength.A partofis income
received during hisyouthis available to his consumption duri g
retirement.He remains no bequests for his descendants.
Lettingcl(t)andc2(t) b e  per capita re lconsumption of the
younger and the older generations respectivelythe utilityof a
representative person b rn inperiodl i s  escribed by
(1) U =U (Cl(の,C2(t十1))
whereU is astrictly quasi-concave indicator.
By foI1owing thelife h story of a representative man,we can
solve an allocation problem between currentconsumptioncl(t)and
future consumptionc。(t十1).This individualworksin periodt,for
which he rceives a wage,o(t) . H e  retires n periodt十1.Then
interest income becomeshis only income.Thus he allocateswage
in periodtbetween current andfuture consumption soasto maxi-
mize his utility(1),given the rate ofinterest existing on one-
periodloans from periodttot十1,r(t十1).That is,he maximizes
his utilityfunction(l)subject o
(2) c,(t)+ 1'j. (j?)=u,(')
The necessary conditions for optimality are
(2) c,(')+ 1'j;(tjt)=u,(':)
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(3) 普= (,+r(一器 .
The corresponding sufficie cy conditionisalways satisfied by the
assumption of strict quasi-concavity onU Therefore we can get by
(2)and(3)
(4) C j(t)=Cl(ω(の,「(t十1))
(5) c2(t十l)=c2(ω(t),r(t十l)).
0 n  the other hand,production is assumed tobecarriedon sub-
ject toconstant returns to scale with respect tolaborL(t) and
capitalK().Definey(t) a s  output er workerandk(t)ascapita1
per worker.Then production is g ven by
(6) .y(t)=f( k(t) ) ;f> 0  andf' < 0.
Producer d mands thelements of production so as to maximize
his profits;
(7) ω(の=f( k(t:))-k(t)f(k(t))
(8) r(t) = f'(k(l::))
Finallywe assume that population born at periodt, L(ll), i s
(1十g)t,which is thelabor force in periodt.
3.Golden-rule and wealth-capitale【luiIibrium
Thissection larifies the rea ons whythelong-run equilibrium
in thelaissez faire s not attainable to the golden-rule.
We described(4)and(5)as each individual's al!ocation between
current and future consumption byfo11owing hislife-cycle in the
previous section.Being obtained from maximizing ut lity subject
to a budget constraint(2),equations(4)and(5)identically satisfy
(2),that is,
4
(9) c1(u1(t),r(t十1))十c。(ω(tr(t十11十r(t十 l
-138-
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Now the planned consumption of each individualis notrealized
untiltotalmarket demand is equalto totalmarket supply. The
market clearing in periodtrequires thatconsumptionC(の lus
investmentK(t十1)-K(t) i s  equalto ou put f(k(の)L(の. Con-
sumptionC (t:)i  periodtconsists of consumptionc1(w(l1),r(t十1))
L(t) o f  a yonger neration wh chworks and consumptionc2(ω
( t-l),r(t))L(t-1)of an older generation,born at periodt-1,
which retires at psriodt.Therefore we have
(10) cl(u1(l),r(t十1))L(t)十c2(,o(t-1),r(t))L(t-1)
十K(t十1)-K(t) =f( k(t))L(t)
TransposingK(t十1)-K(t)from theleft handof (10)to he right
hand and ividing both hands byL(t),we obtain
(11、 f,(ω( j、.r ( t十1、十_C2(ω(t-1)'「(t) )、一一・ -・、一一 、-/ l ' 、一 ' -1・' 1十9
=f(11(の)-(1十g) k(t十1)-l k(t).
In perfect competition,the equationof demand forlabor to its
supply requires th  equation of wageu,(t)to he marginalprodct
of labor.Thenequation(9)can be expressed;
(9)' c1(u,(t),r(t十l))十C2(u1(t,r(t十1l 十r(t十1
=f(,k(t) )-k(t)f'(k(の).
The system of simultaneous equations,(7),(8),(9)'and(11),
describes the dynamicpath in thiseconomy.We reduce equations
(9)'and(1l)to a equation;
(12) k(t十1)-
(i (の一
,l1。[ω(t
c。(ω(t
r(t十1
1十r (t十1)
-1),r (t
1十r(t
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When the dynamic system of (7),(8)and(12)convergesto the
1ong-ru:n equilibriuml2),it must satisfy
( 3  g-r* 1r_ c2( u*, rつ 、_01 )  一 商、 (1+g)(1十rつ ノー '
This equation implies e ther thefamiliar golden-rule equation,
(14) r* =f(是つ =g,,
or the wealth-capitalequilibrium defined by Gale〔3〕l31,
(l5)1._ c2(ω*, rつ _ω'-c,( w', rつ- -(1十g)(1十rつ 一 l 十g
The wealth-capitalequii bri m asserts that the amount which a
retired generation holds i private wealth, (,o''-c,つL(l ), i s
exactly equalto the stock of capitalK 'L (t十1)which a working
younger neration uses.By theway,the golden-rule path s own
by(14)is a balanced growth path which maximizes th  utility.
Now equation(l2)is equivalent to the fo1lowing equations;
(16) k(t十1)=e。(ω(t1十9
r(t十1
1十r(t十1十要fi(t)
(17) h(t十1)=? h(t),
for we ca:n make a new variable in(12)as
(l8)h(t) =k(t)-c。(u'(t-1 ).r(t1十g)(1十r(の)
Then we can make a transformation of (l 7 )to〔t l 十r(r)1(17)'h(t十 1 ) = Ii- h(0).
r=o l十g
Therefore ifthelong-run equilibrium in the conomy becomes
(2) We attach sterisk(it) t o  the quilibrium values n the1ong-run
(8) We can get(15)becausellSf=t‘'・一cj *by(9)
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the wealth-capitalequilibrium,eitherr'=f( kつ>g orh(0)=0,
atleast,must hold there.We defin hereii asthe capitalper
worker inthe wealth-capitalequilibrium and easin thegolden-
rule.If the conomy is achieving the wealth-capitalequilibrium
whenh(0)キ0,it impliesk*=i>kobecause f(1ll)くg.0n the other
hand,whenh(0)=0,thelong-ru  equilibriumcoincideswith the
wealth-capitalequilibrium.But we cannotsta ewhetherk*=kj jkg
ork*=;i< kg.
Next we examine th  economic i plications ofh(の.Firsof all,
the first term of the right hand in(16)expresses th  wealth in
terms of aman born atperiodt十1which a generation born at
periodtholds(4) Consider n o-classicalproducers who borrow
allstocks of capitalfrom the market without their-selvesfunds.
Then the first term of the right hand in(16)impliescapitalin
terms of aman born at periodt十1which a generation born at
periodtlends to the producers,that is,private c pitalper worker
inperiodt十1.As1l(t十1)(=当きif,(t))is the di?erence be-
tween capitalperworkk(t十1)and private c pitalper worker
C2(u1(tr(t十1
1十r(t十1) , we can interpret1l(t) as ocialcapital per
worker是'(の in the sense d acribed be1owl5):
There exists ocialcapitalper worker1二(0)in thebeginningof
history.This capital,cooperating with rivate capitalandlabor,
(4) In(9)dividing wage minus consumption in youth,i.e.wealth held
by a man born at ,by 1十g,we can obatin hefirst te1m of the
right hand ina0.
(5l See Stein(8)and(9)regarding to6uch socialcapita1.-l41- 7
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is used in the productive activity.Aseveryone in this econ my
bindes on socialrule such that he cannot consume consumption
goodsover the presentvaluesof his income at any period,no one
consumes both socialk二(t ) L(t)and its imputed interests(t)
k'(t)L (の.Therefore(l十r(t:)、)k t)L (ll)becomes socialcapita1
in the next period,that is,1十「(t)k'(t)becomes socialcapital1十9
per worker二(t十1)in the next period.
The second imlication ofh(t) i  economics is to interpreth(ll、)
asliabilities of enterprise,1:(t:), nterms of a worker emp1oyed
in it.The enterprise in it  inauguration borr wsil(0)L(0)from
government or a financialinstitution and employs his a capital
stockin the productive activity.That is,this capitalstock in
terms ofa worker emp1oyed in the nterprise is ,1l(0). The
enterprise must return the principaland interest(l十r(0))1 0)
L(0)to thelender at he nd of period 0.Then it renews a
bond of debt.Thatis,it pays(l十r(0))1(0)L(0)to thelender
at he nd of period 0 and,at the same time,borrows(1十r(0))
i1(0)L(0)from thelenderat th  beginning of periodl. It em-
ploys the newly borrowedliabilities11(l)L(l)=(1十r(0))11(0)L(0)
as capitalstock in periodlas wellas in period 0.This capital
stock interms of aworker emp1oyed in the nterprise is
1l(l )= 1十「(0).1l(0). I n  a similar way1十9
(l8)1(t)= 1十「(t-1)1(t_1)1十g
holds at any time after period2and
('9) k(の=能(i器+'(,)
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holds at any periodwhen capitalstock isfinan edbysaving of a
young generation ndliabilitiesof the enterprise from government
or afinancialagency.Thus(l6)and(l7)hold.
The third implication ofh() i s  aclaim to government for
goods.Government owes a amount of natiOnaldebt,d(0)L(-1)
to an older generation in he rigin of history.Government
attaches to the debt the same interest rete as he interestrate of
capital.Then gover ment must return theprincipaland interest,
(1十r(0))d(0)L(-1),toanoldergeneration at he nd of period
0.This return is ealized by that government inducesa younger
generation totake over(1十r(0))d(0)L(-l ).That is,govern-
ment at he beginning of period1owesthe amountof d bt,d(1)
= 1 十「(0)d(0),to a man bom at period 0.And1十9
(20)d(t)= 1十「(t-1)d(t_1)1十g
holds inL the same way at any period2.That  younger neration
purchases the debtis indifferentthat th  gener ionlends capital
to producers,because bothinterest rat of the debt and capital
are samelo1.Therefore a gen ration born at periodtlends to pro-
ducers saving minus purchased debt ascapitalat the beginning
of periodt十1;
K(t _f C,(u1(t),「(t十1)) _d(i十l)、L+ 1)一、商(商 解 可  -1 g-/ ( t )'
Expressingthis  terms of aworker emp1oyed in producers,we
have
C61 we regard theebt and capitalas wealth in perfect safety.
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(21) k(t十1)= _d(t十1)1十g '
Deflningd(t十l)=-(1十g)1t(t十l )  here,then we can reduce(20)
and(21)to(l7)and(16)respectively.
Samuelson〔6〕,〔7〕,Diamond〔2〕and Stein〔8〕,〔9〕 think,as a
behavior of capital accumulation,that saving of a working
generation bec me totalcapitalin the next period.The dynamic
path of the conomy in their models is in fact described by
(22)k(t十l)=C・(ω(t),「(t十1)) .(1十g)(1十r(t十1))
Camparing(22)with simultaneous equations(16)and(l7),we c
understand(22)shows the world ofh(t)=0,that is,the world
withoutsocialcapitalorliabilities of the nte prise o  nat onal
debt.
Finally in this section we consider th  conomic meanings of
both cases of normaland ab orma1,and cl rify the causes of
occurrence of the abnormalcase.We defin  the normalcase as
case that the goldon-rule stock ofcapitalislarger than the
amountof wealthpeople wish tohold in thelaissez faire,that
is,ko>iand also the abnormalcaseaskg<i.The1ong-run
equ出brium becomes the golden-rule when bothh(0)キ0 and
ko>;i.This means by(17)'
'* =llmIj[ 1+r(r) .h(0) t- t'0 1十g > 0
We can interpret 立 1 十「() as the future value inperiod 0 inr=o 1十g
(7) see Cass(1〕
10
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terms of aunit ofcapitalorliabilities or n t onaldebt(7). Thus
the future value ispositive in he normalcasewhenh(0)キ0.0n
the other hand,thelong-run equ出brium becomes the wealth-
capitalequilibrium when bothh(0)キ0 andkg< -1ll.This meansby
(l5),(16),(l7)and(17)'
limh(t)= 0 ,t-u
that is,
(23) limfI 1 十「() = 0 .‘一ar=o 1十g
(23) implies th  future value in period 0 interms of a unit of
capita1orliabilitiesor n t onaldebt becomes valueless,or inother
words,theterms of rade from present to future never become
favorable.Such a path can provide th  same consumption or
utilitylevelfrom alower initialcapitalstock.The path can afford
the opportunity of decreasing the itialcapitalstock t no cost
in future consumption.And also there is ome other path ofcapita1
accumulationwhich provides atleast in each period as much
consumption or ut出tylevelas this path and provides n some
periods more than this path.Therefore capitaloveraccumulation
takes place in this program.The program should be said to be
inefficient.
4.Stabii ty analysig sang sociaI security
In previous section we  got into our discussion under an assump-
tion such thatk() converges to eitherio kg ast becomes
inli ite.We show,in fact,eitherk(l1)→iiork(t)→k‘,ast→oo in
this section.In rder to show this, weshow the stability of
-l45- 11
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simultaneous difference equation of (16)and(l7).
We specify,for simp「icity ofanalysis,theut出tyfunction(1)as
(24) U =βlogc1(t)十(l一β)1ogc2(t十1) (0くβ<1).
Then we can derive from(5)
( 5) 'c2(t十1)=( l-,li)(1十:r(t十1))u'(t)
的nsidering(7)and(8)together with(5)'we can exp ess
system of (l6)and(17)as
(25) 是(-=f章語(f(是(t))一是(t)f' 1(t)))+
1十f(k(t) ),l(t)1十9
(26) h(_=j「(t))h(t). the
Now we cosider pairs( k,1t)ofk(t)andh(t)such ask(t十1)
=k(t)in(25).Such pairsare
(27) h=jjf,(是)(,k-t-+j(f(o-1f'(k))
Then we have
(28)signh=s1'gn(k--? (f(表)-11f (k))
Asassuming that wa e function
( 7 )  ω(t)=f( k(t) )-k(t)f'(1t(t))
is aconcavefunction,we can depict twopossible patterns which
areshownby Figuresland2. C pitalstock in he wealth-
capitalequilibrium,石,satisfies
k=t-+j(f(ii)-tf'(あ).
Then we get from(2S)and Figuresland2
(那)' s i p i = n'p ( i-是^).
12 -146-
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Thus we obtain
h< 0  for 0 <k <ii,,
h=0 for k=1k,,
h> 0  for i>k.
Differentiating(27),we have
生 = 1+g11_1一β(_f")_hf'、dh 1十f、' 1十g 1十gノ
and
? lh>0> 0
because l>1一β(-1f'') for1lf=k-1一β(f-kf)、>i十g 、' l十g l.,l
0 in bothfigures.
0 n  the other hand,considering pairs(1k,h)ofk(t)andh (t)
such as;l(t十1)=h(t)in(26),we get
(2g) 9-f(?);,=01十9
And we have1l1(t十1)=h(t)in(26)when either f(1l1)=gorh=0.
Next we ascertain an existence of pairs such that both1l1(t十1)
= k(t)andh(t十1)=h(t).Pairs such ask(t十1)=k(t)are presented
by(27)and pairs such ash(t十1)=1l(t)are  expressed by(29).
Then we can depictFigures3-5,by which wecan ascertain pairs
( k,h)that satisfyboth(27)and(29).Figures3and4correspond
to Figure1,in wh chh< 0 f o r 0 <k くk,h=0  fork=k andh> 0
fork>ktAnd Figure5corresponds toFigure2,in whichalways
;t> 0  for anyk>0,
Now we discuss the tab出ty of he system.First of a11,wesketch
the movement of the system which is hown by(25)and(26).We
14 -148-
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getk(t十 l ) >k(t) i n  position above the curve which is hownby
(27),because
and
(25)
一>#(i (') 一常(f(是('))一 f'(是(t型
k(t十1)=? (f(1k(t))-k(t)f(k(t))
十1十f( i ( t ) ) h (,l1 .1十g
Similarly we getk(t十1)く1i(t)in  position be1 w the curve
which is hown by(27).And we have 1t(t十1)(=-x
h(t))> 1i(t)because of'(k(t) ) >g when bothh(t) > 0  and
k(t) <ko.Similarly we haveh(t十1)く h(t)whe  bothh(t)>0
andk(t) >ko,h (t十1)く h(t)when bothh(t) < 0  andk(t) <kg,
and 1i(t十1)>h(t、whe:n bothh(t) <0andk(t) >ko.Thus wecan
draw thearrows in Figures3-5which indicate the direction of
movement ofk( )andh(t). We  show them in Figures6-8.
;t''く0 in the1ong-run equilibrium(「, 1「)of the system of
(25)and(26)holds only in Figure6.h''く0impliesh (t)く0and
h ( 0 )く0 because
(26) h(t十 1 ) = 1十f常l))h(t)
and
1十f(1k(t) > 01十9
We can obtainh(t) く 0  only when we interpreth(t)as aclaim
to government for goods among three implications in ec!lmics
inthe previous section. B y  the way,it becomes clear f om-149- l5
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Figure6that is equilibrium(1「 , 1 P)is a saddle point,as
indicated by hearrows point ngthe directionof movement.This
means that the1ong-run equilibrium becomes thegolden-rule
only when thepath in is economy is on the boldline through
the qu出brium. Govemment must specify the initially ssued
amountsof nationa1 debtd(0)which must be chosen for initia1
capitalk(0)in order to attain the golden-rule.
And whenh( 0 )=0 in Figure6,the path movesonly  the
k-axis a h(t)=0 andconverges to the point(-,0)(8).
We show in this paragraph t atthe equilibrium point(、k,0)is
stable wb nk(0)>0 andh(0)>0.Atfirst,we point that(k( ),
h(t))≧0 necessarily holds forany period because of (25)and
(26)when(1k(0) ,h(0))>0,that is,(k(t),h(t) ) i s  bounded
from be1ow when( k(0)h( 0 ) ) > 0.Secondly,when11o>k(t) > 0
andh(t)>0,we havek(t十 1 ) >k(t)and 1t(t十 1 ) >h(t)from
Figure6.As 0 >ko- 1一β(f(ko)-kof(ko) ) =h =limh(t)by(27)1十g t-
and Figure6when1k(t)→ko,both1ll(t)→ooandk(t)→ig never
hold ast-oo.Thus the path inthe domain ofko>k(t) > 0  and
h(t) > 0  necessarily th ust in o the domain of (k(t), h(t) ) >
(,ko,0). Thirdly1ll(t十 1 ) <h(t)holds because of (26)when
( k(t ) ,h(t) ) > (ko,0),that ish(t) becomes onotonica1ly
decreasing sequence when (.1i(t), h(t) ) > (1to,,0).Becauseh(t)
is bounded from below asdescribed above,1l(t)converges to
zero.Fourthly,when(k(t),h(t) ) > (,ko,0), k(t十 l ) >k(t)holds
(8) The stabi「ity of the system withh(0)=0 hasbeen already nalyzed
by Diamond〔2〕and Stein〔8), 9 ,  They only discussed th
movement of the path on the ,t-axis from ur viewpoint.-153- l 9
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in theleft position of thek(t十 1 ) =k(t)curve unulk(t十1)
intersects thek(t十1)=k(t) curve,where(27)expresses th
k(t十1)=k(t)curve.0n the other hand,k(t十1)く1k(t)holds
in the right positio:n of the curve untilk(t十1)interseG ts th  curve.
Accordinglyk(t十1)wi1lbe,atlast,on he curve i:n bothcases.
Asthe steep of the curve ispositive andh(t十 1 ) <h(t) i n (k(t),
h(t) ) > (kll,0),a point on he curve,as soonas the point is on
the curve,thrust into he right position of the curve.In the position
k(t十 1 ) <k(t)holds untilk(t十l)intersects the curve. And
again1t(t十1)willbe on th  curve.Afterthis,1 (t)repeatsthe
similarity.After all, k(t)converges toi.Thuslim,lt(t) =iandl_1要 h(t)=0,that is,the sequence(i(t),1t(t))oonverges to the
point(1i,0).
In Figure7thelong-run equilibrium(,0) s asaddle point.
But as alwaysh(t)=0  whenh( 0 )=0,the path moves only on
thek-axis andconverges to the point(ik,0).
Summing up above,we obtain thefo1lowing results:the wealth-
capitalequilibrium(i,0)is stable wh n both;l(0)j j0 and-k>ko
hold,the golden-rule equilibrium(ko,;tつ is asaddle pointwhen
both11( 0 ) < 0andk>? hold,and the path whenh( 0 )=0
converge to thwealth-capitalequilibrium even though the normal
caseko >-k.
The remainning problem is whether the golden-rule equilibrium
(kg,1tつ in Figures 7 a n d 8 i s  stable or not. The golden-rule
equilibriumpointis on thepositive orthant i bothfigures.If
initialconditions arek( 0 ) > 0  andh(0 ) < 0 ,the  path in this
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economy never converges to thepoint(1l1・o,1i'')because 1l(t) < 0
always holdsby(26). Accordingly thepossibilityof convergence
to the golden-rule isonly remained by(k( 0 ),h( 0 ) )>0  o r (k(0),
h(0))e R11l,.In fact wecan state the globalstabilityof hegolden-
ruIe(.1o,1tつ by applying the following theorem to the system of
(25)and(26).(9)
THEOREM Constlderanautonomou s djferencl syste,n
''(t十1)=f('t (t),u'(t))
ω(t十 l ) =g(v (t),u'(t))
ωh-e(u,ω)むoa thepa配'a've orthaat.me fmctionsfa ㎡g
areassum e d to1be ofclassClo,t Ri.Furthernlore suppose there
easな a-gae guiZt'6rt'ω n 如'n t (-v,i)eR;s“cat thati=f(ti,一ω)
and-u1=g(i; -u,).Thenifthefol1o,ot,igcond,tltionsaresatisfied,
theeqtnllibriumpoit lt (-v,-,o)isstable加 thgtobal:
(A) 1- (fi,gu,-fu,g,,)v u1 fig > ・o
(B) 1- (f,ulf十g,-1gl)十
(f。g,,,-fug.。),,ω1fgl>o
(0) 1 十 (f,lvげ十g_u,1g1)十
(fvgu,-fu,g,,)v u,1fig> 0
for a11 (v,,o) 加Ri;
for au (υ,・ω) 加R;;
for a li (・t, u,) 加R1.
When(k( 0 ), h( 0 ) )'eRj, (k(t),h(t) )liRj necessarily holds
by(25)and(26).There exists a unique equ出briumpointonthe
(9) See Takahash〔11)with regard to proof  Theorem.
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psitive orthant in Figures7and8.Thuswe can state theg1obal
stability of the difference systemof (25)and(26)if three conditions
are satisfied.Theconditions(A)-(C)for the g1obalstab出ty of
(25)and(26)are expressed by
(30) 1- 1一β(-,l,fつ士> 0  foralZ (1k,h)i n R i;1十9
(31) - f″ .1l,去 > 0  fora11(k.',)inRi;1十g
(32) 2十(2? (-?″)十,j:g li))去> 0
fora li( k,h) 加 R';l,
where
K=? (f(,k)-,lf(k))十? h> 0
flora11(k h)in Rj.
It is clear that(31)holds f ra1l(k(t),11 t))inR:11..And
(33) ? (k)-1f' (k))/k>一要f(f(k)一‘llf'( k))=-1f''(k)
holds by the concavity of wage function(7).Finally(32)holds
when the lasticity of the marginalproduct of capital(-1f'1f')
is ma1ler than2.
Furthermore,aslong as we supposek( 0 ) >h( 0)l≧0,we have
k(t十1)-h(t十 1 )=? U(,l1(t))-k(t、)f'(k ( t、) ) > 0
(,+,)='+ifi'))- 。・
Thus we getk(t十 1 ) >h(t十1)≧0.This meams socialcapita1
or capitalfinanced by theliabilities of the en erprise never exceeds
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totalcapitalin th s economy.
We summarize thissection. When there exists ocialcapita1or
theliabilities of the nterprise in thiseconomy,the golden-rule
equilibrium s globa1ly stable in the normalcase and th wealth-
capitalequilibrium is globally stable intheabnormalcase. When
there exists theclaim to government for goods, the golden-rule
only exists in the abnormal case and becomes a saddlepoint.
When none of them exists,the pa  in this economy converges
to the wealth-capitalequilibrium in both no maland ab ormal
cases.
5.Stabii ty analysis with socialEecurity
The previous section shows that the path in the conomy
converges to the golden-rule equilibrium when both i,o、>11l and
h ( 0 ) > 0  hold and to the wealth-capitalequilibrium whenh( 0 )
=0 or bothh( 0 ) > 0  andko くihold. The optimality of dynamic
a11ocation requires thatthe path converges to thegolden-rule
instead of the wealth-capitalequ出brium.This section showsthat
government can convert thewealth-capitalequilibrium to the
golden-rule equilibrium when t adds a socia1 security program
between a younger neration nd an older generation s its
instrument to the system d scribed in the previous section. Inthis
connection such a socialsecurity ystem is not fully-founded but
pay-as-you-gosystem. Furthermore this section examines tro-
ducing pay-as-you-go socia1 security program to the conomy
never decreases the utilitylevelof each generation in steady-state.
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worker and pays benefits ofT a(>0)to eachretiredperson.Then
(12)in section3is rewrtten as
(34) k(t十 l )- c。(ω(t1十9 r(t十 l1十 1l-(t十1
-ii「)(,'(')-
T ,
-一 十
1十g
c。('ω(t
l十9
-1 r(t
1 十 r ( l
= 0 .
There are fuliy founded anpay-as-you-go social security
systems. The fully-fouded socialsecurity ystem is asystem in
which governmentlevies tax s ofTlon each younger p son,
uses these as capitalin he nextperiod and pays the principal
and interest ofT,, o him.ThenT :t=(1十r(t十1))T, holds.
Considering th s equation,(34)becomes
(35) 1'(t十1)-
c
c。lω(t
1十g
ω(t
1十9
r(t十1
1十r(t十 l-1 r(t
1十r(t
-'jjj)(,'(,)
)= 0 .
(35)is the same as(16),which is equivalent to(16)and(l7)
that imply no socialsecurity ystem. This means that the path
in fully-fouded socialsecurity is the same asthe path without
socialsecurity aslong as fully-founded system does not vary the
initialvaluesof 是(0)and1l( 0 ).
The path in pay-as-you-go socialsecurity system is different
from the path in fully-founded socialsecurity. Pay-as-you-go
security system in which governmentlevies tax s ofTtupon
each younger p son and pays benefits ofT 2 to each retired
person in this period,that is,governmentlevies'「lL(t、,s sum
totalon a younger neration nd transfers allamounts(l,fT,L()
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to an older generation.Asapopulation of n older generation
1 ' l ' f '
is-times as many as a popuation o a younger neration,l十9
a retired person ca  receive(1十g)times as much asayounger
person pays.ThusT 2=(1十g)T,holds. U ing this relation,we
can express(34)as
(36) k(t十1) co(w(t(1十g
r(t十1
1十r(t十1
-1常)(1t(t)-
十 1十;:i(t))= 0'
This is e(luivalent that
(37) 是(t十1)=1十9
+'1ii)-
(能) ,(-=ii「)-,
because we can set in (36)
(39) h(i十 l ) =k(t十1)- 1十g
+ ,r,,l 十 r ( l 十 l )  '
十 T lm( l-十:.t)-
t〇(t-1
1十g
r(t十1
1十r(t十1
c,('u (t
r(li
1十r(ll
T,
一 商
r(t十1
1十r(t十 l
When pay-as-you-go socialsecurity program h sbee:n enfo-
rced by government,a representative person regards his payments
T,as a decrease of his income and present value of benefitsT2
(=(1十g)T,) a san increase of his income. Then his budget
constraint becomes in tead of (2)
(40) c1(l)十 C2(t十1) =,〇(t)_T t十 l-l9_T 1(l十r(t十1)) 1十r(t十1)
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Specifying the utility function as(24)in this section too,we can
derive hisfuture consumption as
(4l) lj;組 )=( 1-ii) (f(k(t、)、)-k(t)f(k(t、)、))-(1一β)(1- )T l.
Substituing(4l)into(37)and arranging it with an aid of (7)
and(8),we get he system d scribedasfol1ows;
(37)' k(t十1)=? (f(k(t、))-k(t、)f(k(t)))
_Tf1一β十 β 、十 1 十f('k(の)x'、.1+g 商 /  1+g
/l(t).
(38) h(t十1)=1十f(k(t ) )  11(t).l十g
(37)'implies that totalcapitalinthis economy cons sts of an
amount which would become private capitalif p y-as-you-go
security program were not enforced,an amount which in fact does
not become private capitalbecause of the security program,and
an amount which forms capitalas socialcapita1orliabilities of
enterprise. Thre  amountsare shown bythefirst erm,second
term and the third term of the right hand of (37)'respectively.
Now consider pairs(k, ,h) o fk(t)and;l(t)such ask(t十1)
=k(t)in(37) ' ;
十 1「l(? 十 l 十f量(1k)-))
Comparing(42)with(27),we see at the socialsecurity prog am
and the increment of payment shift thek(t十1)=k(t)curve
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Differentiating(42),we have
dh _1十g f_1一β k , ? ,f '-af-1+f(k)一、1 ii:ij-(-f)-一てifi_hf'、
1+gノ
(44) 告l1r,>o>? lT,=o・
0:n the other hand,we sefrom(38)thath(十1)=h(t)
holds whenh=0  or f(k)=g.
Figures9and10 show above,where言is a solution of (42)
withh=0a.The arrows pointing he direction of m vement of
(k(t),h(t) ) i n  Figures9and7are same,while t e arrows in
Figures10 and6are same.Theconditions of theorem d scribed
in the previous section being satisfied,the path in the conomy
converges to thegolden-rule in Figure9and to ew ealth-
capitalequ出brium in Figure10lu1.
Figure 10 shows that pay-as-you-go security system only
的 As :iis asolution of (42)withh=o,isatisfies
f =j;語 (f(i)-i f  ( ) )-r,(再+ふ)
This equation sh ws the wealth-capitalequillbriumunder pay-as-you-
go security system.
的Transposing therighthandof (37)'totheleft hand and iffentiating
it with respect tok(t十 l ) , w e  have
K = 1- > 0
Thus w e  can express (37)'by the theorem of i plicit function as
( a )  ,ll(t十1)=F (,t(t),h(t))
Then the condition(B)for convergence described in the theorem in
th (rrevioussection becomes
(b )  - > 0
-16l-
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converts old wealth capital equilibrium to new ealth-capital
equilibrium.Showing that i  convertsthe wealth-capita1 equilib-
rium to the golden-rule is Figure 9. The difference b tween
Figures9 andl0 occurs f om different amount of paymentsT,
ior or benefitsT 2 from the security system.Evaluating(42)with
k=ko andT,= 0  when government has not added pay-as-you-go
security programtothe ec nomy y t,we obtain from Figures 9
and10.
F IClRE 9
(conti m,e dfrom the preol.ouspagli) which is always satisfied.And when
other two conditions
( c )? (t+ 1 )-t-+j(k(t)f″(k( t)) )1i( t) >o
(d)  2基十 2jg(-,t(t)f″(1t(t)))1t( t )
L_f″(1i(t))h(t).1l(t) 、.1> o
' l十9  - -
are satisfied,the system of (37)'and(38)converges to(ko,h'、).
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F IGURE l0
(的)  1 = ig一常V ( ig)一 g) ) < 0.
r,=o
是=是g
And evaluating(42)withl= ig when it has a ready a dedthe
program to the conomy andthe economy hasattained the
golden-rule,we get from Figure9
(46) 1 = l一β「( ig)一 io))十 「1 ≧0,十g 1 gT,> 0
k=ko
and,by(45)and(46),,
(47) l「,=T 2 ≧(1一β) (f(ko)-?of'(ko))-(1十g)to> 0.1十9
0 n  the other hand,whenthe path under pay-as-you-gosecurity
system converges to n wealth-capital equilibrium,we getfrom
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(姐) 1 =-一β(f(是g)一 ig) ) j  T' < 0 ,,1十9 1十9
1r,>o
k=,ka
or
C49) ( l-,19 ) (f(ko)-kof'(1ko))-(1十g)kg>
- TtT,- > 0 .1十g
(47)and(49)means that government eedslevying more than
or atleast equalto(1一β)(f(ko)-kof'(ko))-(1十g)koon
each worker in order to achieve the golden-rule by introducing
pay-as-you-go security program. S uelson-Diamond model
considersthe world without socialcapitalor 「iab出tiesof enter-
prise or nationaldebt,1l(t)=0,that is,the world in which t e
path moves only on thek-axis n Figures9and10.Intending to
attain to the golden-rule byintroducing pay-as-you-go security
program in their model,government must ecessarilylay
1「,=(1一β)(fko)-kof'(kg))-(1十g)ko
as ta:xes upon each younger p son. Next consider th  conomy
withsocialcapitalorliabilities of ente prise o  n t onaldebt.
Then onlylevying taxes ofTt within aloosecondition
(1-,li) (f(kg)-1of(1ka) ) >T ,1≧(1一β)(f(ko)-kof(ko))-(1十g)k0> 0,
government can covert the wealth-capital equilibrium to the
golden-rule equilibrium.
We have just given a solution o problem which has been re-
served by Samuelson t7〕and which has been the third problem
of this paper,too.
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Finally we show that introducing pay-as-you- osocialsecurity
program to the conomy never abate heleve1of the ut通ity of
representative person in th  steady-state.Supposing govemment
adds pay-as-you-go-socialsecurity prog am to the nomaleconomy
C1l,o'>1i) ,we  can see that the ffects of he socialsecurity only
shifts the‘1l,(t十1)=k(t)curve in Frgure4upward. That is,
thelong-run equ出brium ofthe ecocomy with socicilsecurityas
we11as withoutsocialsecurity attains the golden-rule equilibrium.
Therefoe ev n though introducing the socia1 security to the
norma1 economy, government only maintais the same utility
levelas in the teacly-state without socialsecurity.Next suppos-
ing govefnment adcls Fay-as-yau-go sccialsecurityprcgram to the
abnormaleconomy(i>‘l1,)and governmentlevieson each youn-
ger person thetaxes of
T,く( 1一β)(f(表,o)-kof(表,g ))-(1十g)ko,
we can see the ffects of the ocialsecurityin Figure10, that
is,the socialsecurity'prog am converts thelong-run equilibrium
iinto定 Then calculatingthe change of theutilitylevclin
the steady-state under the specified util tyfunctin(2A),we get
(50) _d U_=_2:__dt,_十 1-j9 de,d T, c, d T, c2 d T,
By maximizing(24)subject to(40)we canobtain
(51) . C2 =l一βcl
1+ f  β
(52) 1 ? C2-1一β dC l 十 C2f″ dli
l十^r d 「l-ーアd Tl (l十F)2商
(50) is rewriten by use of them;
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(53) 器=? (t+? e' f^' d-k、
l l ! (1十:r)2 d Tlノ ・
By the way
(54) c,=1i(f(ii)-k-f (i)十9-il「,)1十r
holds under pay-as-yon-go securitysystem.And therefore
(的) 去=β(-t f'一解一f春f ' T,)再
十pg-r1:l
1十r
holds.
Here(53)is transformed by us  of (55);
(56) 一多器=告((-f f″一常一喬f″T,
+ e2f二、再+i、.
(1十r)ノ 1十rノ
(54)and
(11)'cl 十? =f(-k)-g-k,
Weget ・
(57) -lj:= ( 1+9)ii+書 1「,・
Substituting(57)into(56)leads to
(能) i義一=告事 (i f″各+,)・
Wecan getbyuseof (51),(別)and(57)
(59) 1i=? (f-ff')- 1「,(? +士) ,
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??
?
??，
1_
1一β十 19
1十9 1_-r
l_
l十g
(-iifつ一
(1十;:1)2
We have,because of l-t-+j(-if″)>o,,
(6,) i<o.d T,
Thus we can say from(58)and(6l),
(62) sign? =sgn?(g-i).
Considering i>定>是gor;;:<i:<g,
we get 器>0. Thcrefore we can
state thatintroducing pay-as-you-go socialsecurity program to
the abnomaleconomy ould raisetheutilitylevelof each genera-
tion i  the steady-state.
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